An old picture of María Corina Machado just to illustrate.

The election strategy of the Venezuelan opposition was truly a marvel of democratic activism to behold: Rooted in a sober assessment of their opponents, they assembled what they had at their disposal to a winning strategy. The principle components were:

  • A credible strategy with a inspiring, popular goal: To use Venezuela’s robust voting system to resist the autocracy’s vote rigging.
  • An organisation fit for purpose consisting of:
    • Small citizen groups (‘comanditos’) that protected their voting tallies at their voting centre
    • Professional coordination and execution at the “Gran Alianza Nacional”, which required considerable technical skills
  • Tireless campaigning and leadership by María Corina Machado

The political work of art that ensued, to me, is on par with the greatest acts of democratic activism in history - right up there with the Maidan Uprising, the Salt March, the Egyptian Revolution 2011, the Tiananmen Square protests, the Anti-apartheid protests, and so many other times that humans sought to free themselves of the shackles of autocracy.

Sadly, so far, the follow up is falling short. The opposition seems to have backslid to its old, erroneous strategies: an overreliance on moral righteousness, international actors, and empty rhetoric. So, what might a better strategy look like from October 2024 onwards?

The basic approach

I recommend a strategy of nonviolent resistance to topple the dictatorship based on the same principles found in Gene Sharp’s “From dictatorship to democracy” (PDF). This strategy is based on the view that, even in a dictatorship, those in power depend cooperation, principally the willing cooperation or at least the reluctant compliance of key institutions such as the security forces, public administration, and economic actors. Nicolás Maduro isn’t strong enough to subjugate the Venezuelan people, he needs help to do that.

“The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty.” - Jean-Jacques Rousseau

The basic approach, then, is to identify the dictatorship’s most crucial pillars of support and undermine those pillars using strategic nonviolent action with the goal to make them crumble and collapse.

Why do I advise against violence? I’m not a pacifist and Venezuelans would be entirely justified to oppose this unjust and brutal dictatorship violently. But given the possibilities I see, I consider it a bad strategy.

  • Violence is one of the dictatorship’s strengths. The idea should instead be to avoid your enemy’s strength and attack their weakness (from Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War”).
  • Violence (especially by foreigners) most often effects the opposite of what we need: It unifies the regime and splits the opposition.
  • Legitimate moral superiority is a key strength of the opposition. Nonviolent action aims to split the regime and engage broader bases of support for the opposition.
  • Violence doesn’t address the main problem: Venezuelan society is too disorganised compared to the dictatorship.
  • A violent coup may just replace one autocracy with another. Even when successful, society is still at the mercy of those in power.

The weapons we employ, then, are nonviolent. But make no mistake about it: This is still a battle against an unrelenting dictatorship. Winning this fight requires about as much discipline, strategic wisdom, and organisation as a military campaign.

The dictatorship’s pillars of support

Which are the most relevant pillars of support that prop up the Venezuelan dictatorship?

The repressive apparatus

The dictatorship reactivated its repressive apparatus, resulting in at least 25 deaths and hundreds of people injured or detained. “Most of the arbitrary detentions were carried out by the intelligence services, both civilian (SEBIN) and military (DGCIM), the Bolivarian National Police (PNB), including its new Directorate of Strategic and Tactical Action (FAES), … and the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB). The last two institutions also carried out arbitrary detentions, in particular, in the context of the protests after 28 July 2024.”1

The regime repressed protests with its notorious Operación Tun Tun (Operation Knock Knock), in which often unidentified and masked security personell knocked on doors and abducted people who participated in protests. All of this has the deliberate effect of sowing fear to express discontent and oppose the dictatorship. Horrible as it is, this reaction was to be expected. Brutality a requirement for the dictatorial control they seek.

This is a reaction by the dictatorship that is to be expected, and courage

  • Ostensibly “public” institutions captured by and serving the dictatorship, including:
    • CANTV and VTV: Curtailing the freedom of expression and information on behalf of the dictatorship
    • CNE: The electoral authorities faking results
  • Subdued political parties (PSUV and system opposition)

Undermining the cooperation of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) with Nicolás Maduro’s regime is a crucial step in destabilising the regime’s power. Gene Sharp’s principles of nonviolent struggle offer a framework for achieving this by weakening the loyalty of the military and encouraging defections. Below is a strategy for undermining FANB’s cooperation, illustrated with examples from successful nonviolent struggles.

1. Encourage Defections through Outreach and Persuasion

  • Target Young and Lower-Ranking Officers: Focus outreach efforts on lower-ranking officers and younger soldiers who may be less ideologically committed to the regime. Use targeted messaging that highlights the benefits of defection, such as protection, amnesty, and economic support. These groups are often more vulnerable to persuasion, as they are less entrenched in the power structure and may feel the brunt of economic hardships more acutely.

Example: In the Serbian nonviolent movement that led to the ousting of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, the student-led group Otpor! effectively reached out to younger members of the military and police. They used graffiti, leaflets, and word-of-mouth to spread messages that the regime was weak and that it was in the soldiers’ best interest to side with the people. This created a critical mass of defections during key protests.

2. Erode the Military’s Legitimacy

  • Expose Corruption and Human Rights Abuses: Publicise instances of corruption within the military leadership and human rights abuses carried out by the FANB. This can be done through social media campaigns, independent news outlets, and international media. The goal is to create internal dissatisfaction and moral conflict within the military ranks, as well as to erode public support for the military’s role in the regime.

Example: During the 1986 People Power Revolution in the Philippines, opposition groups, including the Catholic Church, highlighted the corruption and human rights abuses under Ferdinand Marcos’ regime. This eroded the military’s legitimacy and helped to sway key military leaders, like Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and General Fidel Ramos, to defect.

3. Nonviolent Symbolism and Direct Appeals

  • Use Symbols and Direct Appeals: Encourage citizens to use nonviolent symbols, such as wearing specific colours or displaying certain signs, that signal resistance to the regime. Organize public acts of solidarity with the military, such as vigils and symbolic gestures, that appeal to soldiers’ sense of duty to protect the people rather than the regime.

Example: In East Germany in 1989, during the Peaceful Revolution, protesters used candles as a symbol of nonviolence and peace during mass demonstrations. These symbols, combined with direct appeals to soldiers not to fire on their own people, helped to prevent violent crackdowns and led to the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall.

4. Disrupt the Chain of Command

  • Create Confusion and Doubt: Use strategic misinformation and psychological operations to create doubt within the military ranks. This can involve spreading rumours of high-level defections or the regime’s impending collapse. Such tactics can create confusion and weaken the chain of command, making it more difficult for the regime to rely on the military during critical moments.

Example: In Czechoslovakia during the 1989 Velvet Revolution, dissidents spread rumours and misinformation to create uncertainty within the military and police forces. This strategy, coupled with massive nonviolent protests, led to the peaceful transition of power.

5. Offer Clear Alternatives and Guarantees

  • Provide Assurances and Clear Plans for Post-Defection: Publicly offer guarantees of amnesty, integration into a new democratic system, and protection for military personnel who defect. Establish clear channels for defection and communicate the benefits and safety nets available to those who leave the regime.

Example: In the nonviolent overthrow of Augusto Pinochet in Chile, the opposition made clear, public assurances to the military that their positions would be protected in the post-Pinochet government. This helped to neutralize potential military resistance to the democratic transition.

6. Coordinate International Pressure

  • Leverage International Sanctions and Isolation: Work with international allies to impose targeted sanctions on military leaders and their families, freezing their assets and restricting their travel. This increases the personal cost of continued loyalty to the regime. Additionally, international support for defectors can provide them with safe havens and incentives to break ranks.

Example: During the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, international sanctions and isolation, including arms embargoes and financial restrictions, played a significant role in weakening the regime’s control over its security forces, leading to reforms and eventual negotiations.

Implementation Steps

  1. Create a Network: Establish a covert network of trusted individuals within the military who can communicate securely and pass on the opposition’s messages.
  2. Design a Campaign: Develop a sustained media and grassroots campaign aimed at the military, focusing on themes of patriotism, duty to the people, and the future of Venezuela.
  3. Activate Civil Society: Mobilize civil society to engage in symbolic acts that appeal to the military’s conscience and sense of national duty.
  4. Monitor and Adjust: Continuously monitor the impact of these efforts, be prepared to adjust tactics based on the regime’s reactions, and maintain flexibility in response to changing conditions.

By systematically undermining the FANB’s loyalty to Maduro using these strategies, you can weaken the regime’s ability to suppress the opposition and increase the chances of a successful transition to democracy.

Footnotes

  1. UNHCR. ‘Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’, 17 September 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/advance-versions/a-hrc-57-57-en.pdf, p. 6.